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The education fever in Korea has no sign of slowing down as the compet-
itiveness for going to renowned universities gets more important with the
country’s unemployment crisis. Due to an explosive demand for private ed-
ucation, regulation on private teaching institutes is critical in slowing down
the overheated private education market drive in Korea. Some local govern-
ments have begun to set the constraint on operating hours of those institutes.
With this movement, this paper analyzes the regulation effect on private ed-
ucation expenditures of Korean high school students using Tobit model as
well as nonparametric model with the Youth Panel data from 2007 to 2010.
Patterns of private education expenditure are affected by gender, house-
hold income, parents’ education attainment level, school type, and location.
In addition to different factors of private education expenditure, regulation
effects are different among regulated regions. In Panel Tobit estimation, Seoul
has almost no effect of regulation while Busan’s regulation effect is significant.
Furthermore, this paper conducts stochastic dominance test of Linton et
al. (2010) and Barrett and Donald (2003). In testing stochastic dominance,
regulation effects are shown different depending on the specification of a con-
tact set between unregulated and regulated groups. Also, by conducting joint
hypothesis test, I analyze whether the regulation has been effective consecu-
tively every year since the regulation was implemented. Although the results
are sensitive to specification of a contact set, they are consistent with Tobit
estimation results.
Keywords : Private Education Expenditure, Regulation Effect,
Tobit Model, Stochastic Dominance, Bootstrap
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1 Introduction
The education fever in Korea has no sign of slowing down as the compet-
itiveness for going to renowned universities gets more important with the
country’s unemployment crisis. Both students and parents are obsessed with
going to renowned universities to be on the safe road for the future. The
private education expenditures 1and the private education market has been
increasing every year, causing inequality problems in terms of education.
Therefore, Due to an explosive demand for private education, Korean so-
ciety is at a crossroad as to whether regulating private teaching institutes
is effective in reducing the country’s excessive education drive. A variety of
ways to reduce the private education market have been devised from differ-
ent aspects such as strengthening the public education’s quality of education
and promotion of taking EBS lectures to students. This paper especially an-
alyzes the effect of regulating private teaching institutes with the limitation
on operating hours.
The regulation of private teaching institutes is in fact controversial in
that it hinders students’ right to be educated as they want or it prevents
excessive education fever as well as educational inequality among students.
However, as the discussion over nationalization of regulation is going on,
which is currently upon autonomy of provincial government, it is essential to
clarify whether the regulation is actually effective.
Using the Youth Panel data from Korea Employment Information Service
1The private education should be distinguished from the concept of private institu-
tion’s education. The term ’private education’ refers to encompassing all the methods
of students receiving education privately outside the school such as private tutoring and
private teaching institutes.
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from 2007 to 2010, this paper analyzes the impact of regulations on reducing
private education expenditure. This paper firstly conducts Pooled OLS for
estimation. Then, considering that the dependent variable (private education
expenditures) has zero values, I apply random-effects Panel Tobit model.
In addition to parametric estimation, this paper newly implements the
bootstrap methods of Linton. et al (2010) to test the stochastic dominance
of two distributions with no control and with residuals. One of the two dis-
tributions is the distribution under no regulations, and the other is the one
under the regulations. Especially I perform stochastic dominance test by re-
gions: Seoul, Busan and Jeonbuk2. By figuring out the stochastic dominance
between two distributions, the actual effects of those regulations can be eval-
uated along with the parametric estimation.
2 Literature Review
There have been numerous studies dealing with the private education through-
out the world, which states that the private education and its market are not
confined to Korea and its malicious aspects can be revealed in the future.
Bray (2012) discussed about various policy measures in Asia with respect
to private supplementary tutoring. Tansel (2006), Dang (2008), and Dawson
(2010) mentioned about the supplementary tutoring in various areas such as
Turkey and East Asia. However, the Korea’s private education market is so
overwhelming and exceptional that appropriate plans which alleviate these
education fevers are to be quickly implemented.
2These regions are where the regulations are implemented during 2007-2010.
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As sufficient measures to solve private education problems, there are some
researches regarding Korea’s regulation effects. Kim (2009) applies panel To-
bit model for the data, which indicates that the regulations on the operating
hours of private teaching institutes significantly decrease the monthly expen-
diture on private tutoring and weekly hours of private tutoring from 2005
to 2007. Kim and Chang (2010), on the other hand, focuses on the num-
ber of hours from governmental regulations for private teaching institutes.
Moreover, Lee et al (2009) has shown the effect of policies by applying Tobit
model and Heckman selection model with cross-sectional data. Analysis in
this paper is different from previous studies in that it deals with the regional
regulation effects since 2007 with new type of panel data.
Along with analyzing with Tobit model, I take into account the nonpara-
metric estimation in the analysis. In fact, the goal of regulation on private
teaching institutes does not only lie in lessening the swelling private educa-
tion market, but its goal also is to narrow down the educational inequality,
which can lead to economic polarization in the long run. As Choi (2012)
noted, the income inequality and educational inequality are closely related
especially in Korea. Thus, by applying Linton et al. (2010) and Barrett and
Donald (2003), this paper implements the comparison of distributions before
and after the regulation with respect to private education expenditure.
This paper also has uniqueness in that it uses Youth Panel data, which
has not been used in previous studies. Also, while Kim (2009) analyzes the
effect of governmental regulations during 2005-2007 period, this paper ana-
lyzes after 2007 until 2010, the time when the debate over regulating private
teaching institutes becomes more than ever serious. The estimation comprises
3
of 2007-2010 and excludes 2011 data because there are only 67 high students
left in 2011 panel, which could trigger bias with other data sets on an esti-
mation. In addition to the Tobit estimation, this paper newly conducts the
stochastic dominance test without harnessing the sample’s distributions.
3 Description of Data
3.1 Current Regulations on Private Teaching Institutes
The current regulations on private teaching institutes are different depending
on the regions as the central government gave the provincial governments the
autonomy to establish the ordinance at the province level.3 The ordinance
regulates two agents–private teaching institutes and study rooms (so called
Dokseo-sil) regarding regulations on operating hours of private institutions.
Our regions of interest are Seoul, Jeonlabukdo, and Busan, where the regula-
tions were implemented during 2007-2010 as well as regulation time is either
10 PM or 11 PM.4 In the analysis, even though the regulations are not im-
plemented exactly from January of the year, the regulations are considered
to be impledmented for a whole year5.
3.2 Data
With respect to Korean educational data including private education sec-
tions, Korean Education and Employment Panel (KEEP data) from Korea
3The exact enactment date and the relevant details are shown in Table 1
4In the analysis, we excluded 24:00 PM regulation in the estimation
5However, since Jeonbuk implemented the regulation in December 2009, the regulation
of Jeonbuk is only for 2010.
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Research Institute for Vocational Education and Training and The Survey
of Private Education Expenditures (SPEE) from Korea National Statistical
Office are used in previous studies. These two data sets have strengths and
weaknesses in analyzing the regulation effects respectively. Firstly, although
SPEE data consists of a large number of samples each year, it is not a panel
data, but a cross-sectional, which implies that it is not suitable for witnessing
the regulation effects of students. Also, as SPEE data focus on the expen-
ditures on private education expenditure with the specific elements such as
subjects and a way of receiving private education, it does not contain house-
hold or school information, which are influential factors in private education
expenditures. Secondly, regarding KEEP data, the panel data are not ade-
quate for analyzing high school students during the period 2007-2010 since
there are no subjects of analysis at the time of 2007 through 2010, although
it was suitable for the research of Kim (2009) during the period 2005-2007.
For these reasons above, this paper uses Youth Panel data from Korea
Employment Information Service. Youth Panel is a longitudinal survey that
follows up the transition from school to work (equivalently from adolescence
to adulthood), starting its second round of panel survey since 2007. The
biggest advantage of this panel survey is that it contains abundant informa-
tion about specific individual characteristics both of school and individual
household. Moreover, the private education expenditures are categorized into
many different standards such as subject, measure, and duration of receiving
private education.
The data of our interest are of high school students during the period










Table 1: Yearly Number of Observations in the Panel
among elementary as well as middle school students could be pivotal in some
sense, I confine the analysis on high school students because competition for
entrance exams is much more excessive compared to other groups and high
school students are strongly affected by regulation on operating hours6.
Since the private education expenditure values involve zero values, which
means that there are some students receiving no private education because
of the economic circumstances or other reasons, the analysis of regulation
effect on private education expenditure is based on Tobit model which allows
censored data. With the data used in this paper, the number of observations
for each year is presented in Table 1.
In 2010, the number of students in the panel significantly reduces be-
cause Korean educational system for high school students is three years. The
students in 2010 are middle school students in the beginning of the panel
(2007).




Variables used in the analysis are under the four categories: Individual,
Household, School information, and Regulation information. Firstly, there
are gender and grade as individual variables. If an individual is male, it is
given as 1; otherwise, it is given as 0. Grades reflect the most recent exam
results at school recorded by students and they are evaluated from 1 to 5 with
five quantiles. If a student’s grade is within upper 20 percent, it is recorded
as 5, which gets the highest point.
Secondly, in household variables category, there are the number of sib-
lings, father’s education level, mother’s education level, and average monthly
income. Especially in measuring parents’ education level, I integrated into
four categories: lower than high school graduates, equal to high school grad-
uates, equal to junior college graduates, equal or higher than university grad-
uates. The higher number is given to the higher level of educational attain-
ment. Also, in terms of the number of siblings, the numeric values become
higher with more number of siblings. In case of being an only child, it is
given as zero. The monthly income is an average of earned income, financial
income, income from real estate and other income by taking logarithm, which
is measured with units of 10,000 KSW.
Thirdly, regarding school variables, there are type of schools and school
locations. The schools are divided into three types—general, specialized, and
vocational. Specialized schools consist of foreign language high school, sci-
ence school, and international school7. In vocational schools, agricultural high
7Here, international school is not the school for foreigners, but for Korean students.
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school, technical high school, and commercial high school. Also, this paper
applies school locations instead of household locations since there are few
cases where students’ residential location and their school location are dif-
ferent at the provincial level, especially among specialized school students.
This happens because of the characteristic of specialized schools, which select
students by entrance exams regardless of the regions where students belong
although applying for those schools outside residential area is restricted for
now. In those cases, school locations are much more important than residen-
tial locations. The school locations are reclassified as four categories—Seoul,
Metropolitan Cities, Small and Medium-sized Cities, and Counties (Gun in
Korea).
In the last category, regarding regulation information, there are regional
dummies and regulation dummies. Regional dummies are Busan and Jeon-
buk dummy8. Moreover, regulation dummies are constructed as an interac-
tion term of year and region. As mentioned earlier, Seoul implemented 22:00
regulation in 2009 while Busan and Jeonlabukdo regions implemented 23:00
regulation in 2008 and 2010 respectively9. Most of other regions set up the
ordinance with 24:00 regulations, but they are not included in the analysis.
Additionally, year dummies are included to reflect the country’s economic
circumstances and to compare the regulation effects among regions. These
year dummies are important as Korea and other countries went through the
financial crisis caused from subprime mortgage crisis in the United States
in 2008. In the panel data, actually significant decrease from 2008 in overall
8Seoul dummy is omitted since it is already included in school’s location category
9It means that private teaching institutes should close until 22:00 or 23:00.
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distribution of private education expenditure is shown in Figure 1.
Dependent variable, private education expenditure, is monthly expendi-
ture of all the subjects spending on private education measured by units of
10,000 KSW and it is taken logarithm. It is difficult to distinguish private
education from private teaching institutes from other measures of private
education since students can check multiple answers to what specific private
education they receive. Thus, the private education expenditure is the total
measure of private education such as private tutoring, not solely from private
teaching institutes.
4 Parametric Estimation
4.1 Pooled OLS Estimation
With the panel data, I first conduct the pooled OLS estimation and the
results are shown in Table 5. Concerning individual category, female students
tend to receive more private education than male students. Also, students
with having better grades at school participate in private education more
than those who are not.
In the household category, as the number of siblings increase, the private
education expenditure reduces. Regarding parents’ education level, father’s
education level is more influential than mother’s education level about 6
percent. Moreover, as we can easily expect, more income brings about more
spending in private education.
Next, in the school information category, setting the criteria of location as
9
Seoul, the gap in private education expenditure between locations grow larger
as the school location goes from Seoul to Metropolitan (Gwangyeok City),
City and Gun area. In addition to school location, the difference with types of
high school is conspicuous. Compared to general high school students, special-
ized school students tend to spend more in private education and vocational
school students spend much less than general high school students. Higher
spending in private education of specialized high school students comes from
severe competition among students. On the contrary, vocational school stu-
dents do not spend much in receiving education privately since the rate of
going to universities among them is quite low compared to other two types
of schools.
Lastly, the regulations of Seoul, Busan, and Jeonlabukdo are shown dif-
ferently rather than regulating operating hours. Seoul’s regulation on private
teaching institutes is shown to rather increase the private education expendi-
ture. This can be interpreted as the occurrence of transfer to other measures
of private education as the private education expenditure allows all other
measures of private education. Moreover, the effect of Busan’s regulation is
shown most effective than that of other regions in 2008 and 2010. The private
education expenditure is reduced with the regulation, but the regulation ef-
fect is not statistically significant in 2009. In Jeonbuk region, the regulation





Private education expenditures contain values equal or higher than zero.
Because the dependent variable having zero values causes problems of in-
appropriate estimation for the analysis. Moreover, with Breusch-Pagan test,
which rejected the null hypothesis, I now use the model considering the panel
characteristics. Thus, Tobit model is used when the dependent variable is
censored with the constraints on the dependent variable values.
Mostly, Tobit model is estimated with random effects, yet Honoré (1992)
devised panel Tobit model. However, Honoré (1992) confines the panel of
length at most 2, which cannot be used in our analysis (2007-2010).
The dependent variable is monthly private education expenditure on av-
erage, and I take the logarithm to the dependent variable. Also, to income
and private education expenditure variable, it is re-calculated with household
consumption GDP deflator. The panel Tobit model is represented as follows.
y∗it = x
′
itβ + εit, i = 1, ..., N (1)
In the equation (1), y∗i is latent variable for private education expenditure.
In this model, xit is the vector of factors which can influence on the private ed-
ucation expenditure, which are location, gender, household income, parent’s
education level, school type, grade, the number of siblings, Seoul regulation
dummy, Busan regulation dummy, and Jeonlabukdo regulation dummy. β
is the vector of parameter estimates of xit and εit follows normal distribu-
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tion with the zero average and its variance is σ2. From the equation (2), the
observed private education expenditure yit are presented below.
yi =






The notable point in calculation of y?i is that one is added all values of
y i?10. This is done in order to avoid zero values of y i? become omitted by
taking logarithm. Since y i of value 1 becomes zero with taking logarithm,
it does not make any difference in the estimation. Different from general
maximum likelihood estimation, Tobit model acquires likelihood function
by combining the total sample with censored and uncensored data. Log-





















Based on this model, estimation results are shown in Table 6.
4.2.2 Estimation Results
The results of Tobit estimation are explained with the variables categories
of individual, household, school and regulation information. First, regarding
individual variables, female students tend to receive private education more
than male students. Also, as students have worse grades, they are receiving
less private education than those getting better grades.
10Then, yi = 0 if y
∗
i ≤ 1, and yi = y?i if y?i > 1
11Greene (2011)
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With respect to household variables, I would first explain with the par-
ents’ education attainment level. While both father’s education level and
mother’s education level are shown as positively significant to the private ed-
ucation expenditure, father’s education level has more impact on the private
education level compared to mother’s education level. Moreover, with the
increase in the number of siblings, private education expenditure decreases.
More importantly, as the income and expenditure has positive correlations
each other, the private education expenditure goes up with the rise in house-
hold income.
Now let’s discuss about the school effect on the private education ex-
penditure. Among city-level regions, Seoul has the highest average private
education expenditures. Average expenditures on private education differ
depending on the size of those cities. In other words, bigger the city is,
more private education expenditures are spent. Especially, as counties (Gun
regions) have much lower expenditure on private education, the difference
between Seoul region and Counties is the largest among that with other re-
gions. Also, regarding school type, specialized schools spend more on private
education because those schools (Science high school, foreign language high
school, etc.) are more competitive. On the other hand, considering the fact
that vocational schools focus more on getting a job after graduation rather
than going to college, students at vocational schools spend much less on
private education.
Most importantly, now my analysis of interest is about the regulation ef-
fect on the private education expenditure and the regional difference rather
than regulation time difference is shown to be more influential in private ed-
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ucation spending. In case of Seoul, private education expenditures increase
with the regulation. One interpretation of this result is that the transfer
to other measures of private education occurred instead of receiving private
education at private education institutes. However, there has been regula-
tion effect in Busan. The regulation effect in 2010 is the biggest, followed by
that of 2008 and that of 2009. Even though regulation effect of 2009 is not
statistically significant with Pooled OLS estimation, all regulation effects of
Busan are statistically significant, contributing to reducing the private ed-
ucation expenditures. Lastly, in Jeonbuk region, although the coefficient of
Jeonbuk’s regulation in 2010 shows reduction in private education expendi-
tures, it is not statistically significant. Despite the difference in regions, this
provides critical implications that regulation on private teaching institutes
plays a pivotal role in reducing private education expenditure.
4.2.3 Marginal Effects of Regulation
Once estimating with Tobit model, marginal effects are to be calculated to
figure out the regulation effects. Table 7 presents marginal effects of all vari-
ables, but I will focus on regulation dummies’ marginal effects.
According to Table 7, Impact of regulation on private teaching institutes
is minimal. Rather, private education expenditures of Seoul in 2009 and
2010 increased. Except Seoul, Busan and Jeonbuk regions are shown to have
regulation effects of reducing private education expenditure. Despite the dif-
ference of reduced amount of expenditure, significant reduction in private
education expenditures is noticed. However, in Jeonbuk region, slight fall in
spending private education is resulted, yet it is not statistically significant.
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5 Nonparametric Estimation: Testing Stochas-
tic Dominance
Following the Tobit model estimation, now I analyze the regulation effect
on private education expenditure with the nonparametric estimation of first-
order and second-order stochastic dominance by using the bootstrap method
of Linton et al. (2010) and Barrett and Donald (2003). This method is pivotal
in that it is possible to measure the regulation effect by comparing distri-
butions of two groups–regulated regions and unregulated regions; or regu-
lated year and unregulated year. Furthermore, this paper shows the results
of stochastic dominance test with joint hypothesis to figure out the regulation
effects consecutively after implementing the regulation.
5.1 Test statistic and Bootstrap Methods
Since two sample sizes are not equivalent, I use the modified test statistic
of Linton et al. (2010) as follows.12 M is the sample size of X0 and N is the













01 (x, θ, τ) ≡ F̄0(x)− F̄1(x)
D̄
(2)
01 (x, θ, τ) ≡
∫ x
−∞ D̄0(t, θ, τ)dt−
∫ x
−∞ D̄1(t, θ, τ)dt
12Barrett and Donald (2010) proposed a consistent test of stochastic dominance when
the sample sizes of comparing groups are different.
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D̄01 refers to the difference between CDF of X0 and X1 when testing
first-order stochastic dominance. When testing the second-order stochastic
dominance, D̄
(2)
01 is used as presented above. The weight function w(x) is
analyzed with two forms: w(x) = 1 {x ≤ µ} and w(x) = 1.
The hypotheses are presented below, and D01(x) is different according to
which order of stochastic dominance is tested.
H0 : D01(x) 5 0 for all x ∈ χ,
H1 : D01(x) > 0 for some x ∈ χ
In testing stochastic dominance, I also conduct the test under the null hy-
pothesis, which is the opposite direction of null hypothesis suggested above.
That is, H0 : D01(x) ≥ 0 for all x ∈ χ. This is done in order to clarify the
stochastic dominance since it is uncertain about the stochastic dominance
when the null hypothesis is not rejected. To conduct inferences from the
limiting distribution, bootstrap method is used in this paper. First I assume
that θ0 and τ0 are identified through a moment condition: E[Ziϕk(W ; θ, τ)] =
0, k = 0, 1. The bootstrap test statistic is also a modified test statistic,






























In determining the contact set B̂ ≡= {x ∈ χ :| D̄01(x) |< cK}, wherecK13 is
a sequence that cK → 0 and cK
√
K → ∞, I propose a simple suggestion to
choose appropriate values of c: 1
B
∑B
b=1 D̄01,b(x) . c < max|D̄01,b(x)|. When
c is much less than the mean of D̄01,b(x), the contact set becomes so narrow
that B̂ ≈ 0. When c becomes closer to max|D̄01,b(x)|, p-values become larger
under the null hypothesis. Throughout this paper, the tests of stochastic
dominance for each case is done with this rule of determining the value of c.
5.2 Monte Carlo Experiment
Before testing the stochastic dominance with empirical example, I first con-
duct Monte Carlo Experiment to verify this stochastic dominance method-
ology regarding using the bootstrap methods for censored distribution, es-
pecially in first-order stochastic dominance test. I assume that Xk(θ, τ) =
ϕk(W ; θ, τ). Then, the data generating process is presented as follows.
Let Uk be U[0,1] random variables.
Xk(θ, τ) ≡| 1{Uk < Pk} ×N(µk1, σ2k1) | + | 1{Pk < Uk} ×N(µk2, σ2k2) |,
where k = 0, 1 and 0 < Pk < 1
As the private education expenditure is always equal or higher than zero
value and its distribution mimics mixed Gaussian distribution, I design the
experiment with data generated from folded mixed normal distributions.
Under this design scheme, four different cases are simulated. The first case
is least favorable case (LFC) where two samples are generated with identical
13K simply means MNM+N
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X0 X1
P0 (µ01, σ01) (µ02, σ02) P1 (µ11, σ11) (µ12, σ12)
Case 1 0.5 (0 , 10) (25, 80) 0.5 (0 , 10) (25, 80)
Case 2 0.5 (0 , 10) (25, 80) 0.5 (0 , 10) (25, 70)
Case 3 0.5 (0 , 10) (25, 80) 0.5 (0 , 10) (20, 60)
Case 4 0.7 (0 , 5) (20, 60) 0.5 (0 , 10) (25, 80)
Table 2: Data Generating Process
distribution. The second case is partially dominating case by keeping µ11, σ
2
11,
and Pk levels while changing the value of σ
2
12. The third case is also a partially
dominating case by setting the values of µ11, σ
2
11 and µ12, σ
2
12 respectively
while maintaining the P1 level identical to that of X1(θ, τ). The fourth case




12 and P1 values
are set differently. This is the case where the null hypothesis is invalid.
Each specification of experiment is presented in Table 1. In simulations,
I simply set M=N for each case and conduct an experiment for N=100 and
N=1000. The number of Monte Carlo simulations was 1000 and the number of
bootstrap replications was 500. Moreover, only uniformly weighted function
is used in the experiment and the value of c is {2.0 2.5 3.0}.
Table 8 shows rejection probabilities of Monte Carlo Experiments. In Case
1, the rejection probabilities are similar to the nominal level. As the contact
set goes more into the null hypothesis, the rejection probability converges
to zero. In Case 2 and Case 3, the rejection probabilities are slightly under
rejection or over rejection. But, the rejection probabilities for Case 3 is lower
than those of Case 2 as can be expected from the data generating process.
Lastly, in Case 4, as the null hypothesis is invalid, the rejection probabilities
when N=100 are almost close to 1 while they all converge to 1 when N=1000.
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5.3 Test Results of Stochastic Dominance
Tests of Stochastic Dominance are conducted with first-order and second-
order dominance. Then, for stochastic dominance of each order, the domi-
nance of distribution of private education expenditure under no regulation
over distribution under regulation is tested with no control and with resid-
uals. Especially in testing first-order stochastic dominance, I conduct the
test of joint hypothesis by applying the similar method of getting the test
statistic.
5.3.1 Stochastic Dominance with No Control
In this section, without controlling any other variable, I test the stochastic
dominance with nominal private education expenditure values.
First-Order Stochastic Dominance The CDFs of each comparing groups
are shown in Figure 2. The first comparing group is Pooled sample with no
regulation versus regulated sample. The second is Seoul’s CDF between 2008
(before regulation) and 2010 (after regulation) as Seoul imposed regulation
in 2009. The third group is Busan’s private education expenditure between
2007 and 2009 because Busan region implemented the regulation in 2008.
The last group is samples of Jeonbuk between 2009 and 2010, which reflects
the regulation of Jeonbuk area in 2010.
Along with CDFs of each group, Figure 3 presents difference in CDFs of
each group. As one might expect from Figure 2, Seoul region shows a single
crossing, which shows wide variation in difference in CDF. Also, in Jeonbuk
region, as multiple crossings in CDF occur, it reflects wider variation in
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difference of CDFs. In other cases, the differences are shown all under zero.
The results of first-order stochastic dominance testing in Table 11 and 12.
For each group (Pooled, Seoul, Busan, and Jeonbuk), the number of bootstrap
tests is 500 for each case. Furthermore, as the value of c influences the size of
a contact set (B̂), different values of c are chosen based on the sample sizes
of each case. With the appropriate choices of c, as the c increases, which
implies that the increasing size of a contact set, the p-values also rise when
the null hypothesis is true.
First, in cases where w(x) = 1 {x ≤ µ}, the null hypotheses for all cases
except Jeonbuk are not rejected with different p-values in Table 10. In Pooled
case, judging from the results that the null is not rejected in Table 11 and
rejected in Table 1214, it is compatible to state that regulation has been effec-
tive in a pooled sample. However, in case of Seoul, none of the null hypotheses
is rejected, which implies that there is weak stochastic dominance15 in this
region. This corresponds to the Tobit estimation result that the regulation
has not been effective. Moreover, as the value of c increases, p-values become
lower in Seoul.
P-values of Busan is the highest among the presented cases in Table 11
and they are all zeros in Table 12. As with Pooled case, from these two
tests, the regulation on private teaching institutes are shown effective. In
Jeonbuk region, the results of first-order stochastic dominance testing are
quite different with the weight functional forms. With weight function 1
14In Table 12 (Test 2), the hypotheses are as follows. H0 : D01(x) ≥ 0 for all x ∈
χ; H1 : D01(x) < 0 for some x ∈ χ. The null of Test 1 and Test 2 are opposite direction
in testing stochastic dominance
15Weak dominance refers to a situation when the null hypothesis of Test 1 and Test are
both not rejected, which implies that F0 w F1
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(w(x) = 1 {x ≤ µ}), the null hypothesis is rejected in both tests of Table 11
and 12. In this case, it is uncertain that which group dominates the other,
giving ambiguous conclusion about the regulation effect. On the other hand,
with the weight function w(x) = 1, both null hypotheses are not rejected, so
that this can be said that there exists weak stochastic dominance in Jeonbuk
area, implying that regulation effects are minimal or none.
Overall, the p-values are generally higher where the weight function is
w(x) = 1 than the other case (w(x) = 1 {x ≤ µ}) in Table 11 even though the
reverse results are shown in Table 12. This means that stochastic dominance
of overall private education expenditure under regulation is more explicitly
shown than that of private education expenditure below median. In all cases
where w(x) = 1, except Seoul, p-values of all three other cases are almost 1,
while the p-values are quite different among these cases. Especially in Seoul,
p-values are lower in w(x) = 1 functional form since a single crossing in CDF
occurs (When applying the weight function w(x) = 1 {x ≤ µ}).
As a result of first-order stochastic dominance test 1 and 2, it can be con-
cluded that unregulated group stochastically dominates the regulated group
for Pooled and Busan case. In Seoul, each group (unregulated and regulated)
weakly dominates each other while it is obscure whether any group stochas-
tically dominates the other in Jeonbuk region.
Second-Order Stochastic Dominance In addition to testing first-order
stochastic dominance, now I test second-order stochastic dominance in a sim-
ilar manner. The justification of testing second-order dominance comes from
the results of first-order stochastic dominance that the p-values lie between
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0.01 and 0.0516. As in first-order stochastic dominance test, the weight func-
tion has two forms: w(x) = 1 and w(x) = 1 {x ≤ µ}. The test results are
shown in Table 13 and 1417.
The results of second-order stochastic are almost similar to those of first-
order stochastic dominance. Pooled and Busan cases have shown that the
regulation is effective in reducing the private education expenditure from
the compatible results of Test 1 and Test 2. The noticeable point in this
testing is regarding Seoul and Jeonbuk region. In the previous first-order SD
test, it is shown that there is only weak dominance between two comparing
groups in Seoul. However, the regulation is shown as ineffective at the 10%
level when the value of c is 8 and the values are uniformly weighted, as can
be easily implied by Table 13 and 14. Moreover, in Jeonbuk, the results of
second-order stochastic dominance tests are quite striking in that they show
opposite results depending on the weight functional form. When testing with
w(x) = 1 {x ≤ µ}, both tests in Table 13 and 14 are rejected, which can be
said that it is again uncertain about the existence of dominance. On other
other hand, with w(x) = 1, both tests are not rejected, implying that each
group weakly dominates each other.
5.3.2 Residual Dominance
Testing stochastic dominance directly with the single index can be dangerous
since it ignores economic situations such as depression or economic boom and
16This is because the first-order stochastic dominance implies the second-order stochastic
dominance, but the reverse is not true.
17Similarly, in Table 14 (Test 2), the hypotheses are given as follows. H0 : D01(x) ≥
0 for all x ∈ χ; H1 : D01(x) < 0 for some x ∈ χ. The null of Test 1 and Test 2 are
opposite direction in testing stochastic dominance
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other potential factors affecting private education expenditure. If a country
went through a severe economic depression during 2007 and 2010, the pri-
vate education expenditure might have lessened automatically. Therefore,
although real values of private education expenditures are reflected in the
previous analysis, dominance testing with residuals based on the results of
Pooled OLS estimation is performed in this section by controlling those fac-
tors. Although it might be more appropriate to estimate with Tobit esti-
mation results, it is not applicable to test stochastic dominance due to its
nonlinear aspect. As shown in parametric estimation section, Pooled OLS
estimation results are mostly statistically significant, thereby residuals after
Pooled OLS are used in this section by controlling year effects and all other
factors introduced in parametric estimation. As one might expect, the results
are quite different from the previous analysis.
First-Order Stochastic Dominance Before discussing the test results,
the CDFs of each group are in Figure 4. For each case, Pooled OLS estimation
is performed with the dependent variable, the log of total private education
expenditures. Then, for those residuals, they are divided into regulated and
unregulated categories and then analyzed with the same method of test with
no control. As seen from Figure 4, there are multiple crossings in CDFs,
which is different from 5.3.1. Thus, it implies that test results can change
even without the consideration of weight functional forms.
The results of first-order stochastic dominance of residuals are presented
in Table 11 and 12. The noteworthy point in these tests is that the results
show differently according to the form of a weight function. First, in Pooled
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case, while the regulation is shown as effective with the use of weight function
w(x) = 1 {x ≤ µ} from the compatible p-values of Test 1 and Test 2, it is
uncertain about the dominance with the use of uniformly weighted function
since both null hypotheses are rejected. This difference in results is also re-
vealed in Seoul region. With WF 1, it can be concluded that the regulation is
effective although no dominance is found in other cases of Seoul region at 5%
level. From this result, the regulation is effective among the private education
spending under median while its effect is ambiguous with all expenditures on
private education.
In addition to Seoul, the test results of Busan’s regulation are not only
distinct with the difference in weight functions but also with the previous
analysis (stochastic dominance with no control). When applying WF1, the
regulation is found effective at the 5 % level by comparing the results of Table
11 and Table 12. However, with WF 2, even though Busan region’s regulation
has shown effective in both weight functional forms in section 5.3.1, the
effectiveness of regulation is unclear in all tested values of c as both tested
hypotheses are rejected. As the estimation results are very sensitive to the
value of c, the results of stochastic dominance test show differently in Jeonbuk
region as well. Under the setting that c takes 0.1, there exists regulation
effect in Jeonbuk region for both weight functions at the 10 percent level
and 5 percent level respectively. Other than that, there is weak stochastic
dominance in Jeonbuk region from two tests.
Second-Order Stochastic Dominance The CDFs are depicted in Fig-
ure 6 and the test results are in Table 13 and 14. After controlling potential
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factors to private education expenditures, the effectiveness of regulation in
each case is evaluated differently with the case with no control. First, regard-
ing Pooled case, while the regulation is shown effective under WF 1, there is
weak dominance with WF 2. This result is different from that of stochastic
dominance with no control. Likewise, Seoul’s stochastic dominance test of
regulation is similar to Pooled case. Under the weight function 1 {x ≤ µ},
the results of Table 13 and Table 14 imply that the regulation is effective.
However, under WF 2, each comparing group weakly dominates the other in
Seoul.
In particular, Busan region’s results are noticeable in that the effective-
ness of regulation in that different results are drawn compared to stochastic
doimnance test with no control. In the previous section, although the regula-
tion is shown effective in all weight functional forms, it is only effective with
WF 1 at 5 percent level for 0.7 and 1.0 values of c and at 1 percent level
when c is 0.5. Lastly, in Jeonbuk region, when c takes 0.1 and the weight
function is 1 {x ≤ µ}, regulated group stochastically dominates unregulated
group, which implies the regulation is not effective. Except that specification,
weak stochastic dominance is shown in Jeonbuk region.
5.3.3 Joint Hypothesis Testing
In testing joint hypothesis testing, its goal is to test whether the regulation
is effective consecutively throughout the regulated years. For instance, when
Busan implemented the regulation in 2008, this joint hypothesis enables test-
ing the regulation effects both in 2008 and 2009 compared to 2007 (before
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regulation). The hypotheses and presented below.
H0 = F0(x) 5 F1(x) & F0(x) 5 F2(x) for all x ∈ χ
H1 = F0(x) > F1(x) & F0(x) > F2(x) for some x ∈ χ
The alternative can be H2 : F0 > F1 or F0 > F2, but this joint test is to
figure out the simultaneous effectiveness of regulation, I test with the above
alternative hypothesis. In addition, this joint test is performed with different
null hypothesis to obtain compatible results about the regulation effects, as
presented below.
H0 : F0(x) = F1(x) & F0(x) = F2(x) for all x ∈ χ
H1 : F0(x) < F1(x) & F0(x) < F2(x) for some x ∈ χ.
Despite its complicated form of test statistic for joint test, the test statistic

















where K = MN/(M +N), and O = MQ/(M +Q)
In case of first-order dominance, D̄01(x) = F̄0 − F̄1, and D̄02(x) = F̄0 − F̄2.
Also, M,N, and Q refers to the sample size of X0, X1, andX2 respectively. As
bootstrap statistic and estimating methods are almost identical to previous
sections and proposed statistic, it is omitted in this paper. However, when
using bootstrap methods, in order not to make covariance greater or less
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than zero, it is important to construct the test statistic with the same X∗0 to
obtain D̄01(x) and D̄02(x).
In testing the joint hypothesis, as with previous analysis, the tests of
stochastic dominance are conducted with no control and with residuals and
only first-order stochastic dominance test is conducted. Figure 7 and Figure
8 show CDF of comparing years for each case.
Seoul Region Since Seoul imposed regulation on private teaching insti-
tutes in 2009, the dominance test is done through 2008 to 2010 (2008 vs.
2009 and 2008 vs. 2010). The results are in Table 15 and Table 16. The
stochastic dominance in Seoul differs according to the weight function. First,
in testing stochastic dominance with no control, while each group weakly
dominates each other with WF 1, the results of regulation effects are differ-
ent with uniformly weighted function along with the specification of value c.
When taking c1=0.05 and c2=0.10, as the null of Test 1 is rejected and the
null of Test 2 is not rejected, the regulation is ineffective under this specifi-
cation. However, except that case with uniformly weighted function, Seoul’s
regulation on private teaching institutes is shown as effective.
However, the results of testing stochastic dominance with residuals are
almost opposite to those with no control. With the weight function using me-
dian, the regulation is effective except the case where c1=0.05 and c2=0.15.
In case where c1=0.05 and c2=0.15, the stochastic dominance is obscure
between two comparing groups. On the other hand, the regulation effect is
uncertain in Seoul region’s comparing groups with uniformly weighted func-
tion.
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Busan Region As mentioned above as an example, the comparing years
are 2007 to 2009 (Thus, when testing the stochastic dominance, 2007 vs.
2008 and 2007 vs. 2009). Likewise, the results are in Table 15 and Table
16. Under joint hypotheses, regardless of the forms of a weight function, the
regulation is effective for all specifications of value c (the size of a contact set)
in both tests of stochastic dominance with no control as well as with residuals.
Therefore, even though each year’s comparison of regulation effects in Busan
varies as seen in the previous sections, the regulation has been effective after
implementing the regulation policy in 2008 from the results of Table 15 and
Table 16.
While Seoul’s regulation effects are difficult to state in that the effective-
ness of regulation is different depending on the specification of the size of
a contact set, Busan’s regulation on private teaching institutes can be said
as effective in reducing private education expenditure with the compatible
results of Test 1 and Test 2 for SD test with no control as well as SD test
with residuals.
6 Conclusion
As private education market has been expanding in Korea, various measures
at the government level involve the regulation on private teaching institutes
as well as strengthening the curriculum at school. Among them, the regu-
lation on private teaching institutes is quite controversial because it can be
argued as hindering the right to be educated as students want while it is
interpreted as an attempt to alleviate the education inequality. In particular,
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this paper analyzes whether the direct regulation on private teaching insti-
tute’s operation time is effective in reducing the country’s excessive education
drive.
Although the regulated regions are four regions during 2007-2010 period,
currently there are seven regions regulating private teaching institutes at
22:00 and 23:00 as shown in Table 2. As the governmental regulation is cur-
rently being issued with the national implementation of regulation, this paper
has critical impact in that it has shown whether regulation is significantly
effective in reducing private education expenditures . By applying the Tobit
model with random effects, the regulation effects are shown as different from
region to region. In Busan, the effect of regulation is statistically significant
in reducing private education expenditures although the regulation in Seoul
is minimal or rather increases the private education expenditure. In Jeonbuk,
reduction of private education expenditure is shown, but it is not statistically
significant.
In addition to parametric estimation of panel Tobit model, first-order and
second-order stochastic dominance testing is introduced for the nonparamet-
ric analysis. This is pivotal and significant in that it allows comparing the
distributions of private education expenditure as it is. In particular, boot-
strap method of Linton et al. (2010) and Barrett and Donald (2003) is used
in figuring out the stochastic dominance between regulated and unregulated
groups. According to the estimation results, the regulation of private teaching
institutes is shown effective especially in Busan while its effect is differently
shown in other regions under each specification.
In conclusion, although there are numerous measures for policy makers
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in alleviating the education inequality with the explosive private education
market, regulation on private teaching institutes with their operating hours
can be conducive to alleviate the problem. In the sense that this regulation
could surely slow down the explosive demand for private education for go-
ing to colleges, resulting in less education inequality for students as well as
prevention of more economic polarization coming from education inequality.
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Seoul Sep. 2009 22:00
Gwangju Nov. 2010 22:00
Kyunggido Mar. 2011 22:00
Daegu Mar. 2011 22:00
Busan Apr. 2008 23:00
Jeonlabukdo Aug. 2009 23:00
Incheon Oct. 2011 23:00
Jeonlanamdo Nov. 2007 23:50
Chungcheongbukdo Sep. 2007 24:00
Kyungsangnamdo Dec. 2007 24:00
Ulsan Oct. 2008 24:00
Jeju Jan. 2011 24:00
Daejeon Feb. 2012 24:00
Kyungsangbukdo Feb. 2012 24:00
Chungcheongnamdo Mar. 2012 24:00
Gangwondo Mar. 2012 24:00
Table 3: Ordinance on Private Teaching Institutes
Note: This is based on Act on the Establishment and Operation of Private
Teaching Institutes and Extracurricular Lessons, Article 6-(2) Act No. 8711,
Dec. 21, 2007. The regulation time applies to high school students. In some
regions, the provincial government sets up different regulation time on private
teaching institutes depending on the students’ level–elementary, middle, and
high school.
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Variable Sample Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Gender 5339 1.4781 0.4995 1 2
Grade 5339 3.4126 0.9393 1 5
Siblings 5339 1.2697 0.6566 0 6
Father’s Edu. Level 5339 2.6858 1.0259 1 4
Mother’s Edu. Level 5339 2.3337 0.8756 1 4
Income 5339 5.6722 0.5109 2.3786 7.4191
Location: Seoul 5339 0.1947 0.3960 0 1
Location: Metropolitan 5339 0.4210 0.4937 0 1
Location: City 5339 0.3483 0.4765 0 1
Location: Other 5339 0.0357 0.1857 0 1
School Type: General 5339 0.7797 0.4144 0 1
School Type: Specialized 5339 0.0207 0.1426 0 1
School Type: Vocational 5339 0.1994 0.3996 0 1
Busan 5339 0.1146 0.3186 0 1
Jeonbuk 5339 0.0301 0.1710 0 1
Year dummy: 2007 5339 0.3893 0.4876 0 1
Year dummy: 2008 5339 0.3141 0.4642 0 1
Year dummy: 2009 5339 0.2015 0.4011 0 1
Year dummy: 2010 5339 0.0949 0.2931 0 1
Reg. Seoul 09 5339 0.0337 0.1805 0 1
Reg. Seoul 10 5339 0.0179 0.1328 0 1
Reg. Busan 08 5339 0.0367 0.1880 0 1
Reg. Busan 09 5339 0.0235 0.1518 0 1
Reg. Busan 10 5339 0.0097 0.0982 0 1
Reg. Jeonbuk 10 5339 0.0037 0.0610 0 1
Private Edu. Expenditure 5339 2.2612 1.8516 0 5638
Table 4: Descriptive Statistics
Note: Male students are given zero in Gender variable, and female students
are given one. The values of grade are evaluated according to five quantiles.
Income is monthly household income with unit 10,000 KRW and is taken
logarithm. Parents’ education level is evaluated with four levels.
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Variable Coefficient Std. Err. t P >| t |
Female 0.0943 0.0418 2.25 0.024
Grade 0.1278 0.0223 5.72 0.000
Siblings -0.1462 0.0320 -4.56 0.000
Father’s Edu Level 0.1576 0.0262 6.02 0.000
Mother’s Edu Level 0.0947 0.0302 3.13 0.002
Income 0.6074 0.0442 13.72 0.000
Loc 2 -0.3716 0.0690 -5.38 0.000
Loc 3 -0.3556 0.0675 -5.26 0.000
Loc 4 -0.9310 0.1266 -7.35 0.000
Type 2 0.2902 0.1467 1.98 0.048
Type 3 -1.0668 0.0547 -19.47 0.000
Busan 0.0678 0.1092 0.62 0.534
Jeonbuk -0.3950 0.1328 -2.97 0.003
Reg. Seoul 09 0.3669 0.1400 2.62 0.009
Reg. Seoul 10 0.3292 0.1859 1.77 0.077
Reg. Busan 08 -0.4148 0.1552 -2.67 0.008
Reg. Busan 09 -0.1756 0.1795 -0.98 0.328
Reg. Busan 10 -0.4333 0.2489 -1.74 0.082
Reg. Jeonbuk 10 0.0335 0.3721 0.09 0.928
dum. 2008 -1.3279 0.0528 -25.12 0.000
dum. 2009 -1.5892 0.0666 -23.83 0.000
dum. 2010 -1.7381 0.0909 -19.12 0.000
Constant -0.6921 0.2614 -2.65 0.008
Table 5: Pooled OLS Estimation Results
Note: Busan and Jeonbuk dummies are included in order to estimate the
regulation effects of Busan, Jeonbuk, and Seoul region (Seoul dummy is Loc 1
dummy, but it is omitted in the estimation due to multicollinearity problem
with Loc 2, Loc 3, and Loc 4). Each regulation dummy is an interaction term
of regulating year and regional dummy.
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Variable Coefficient Std. Err. z P >| z |
Female 0.1878 0.0750 2.50 0.012
Grade 0.1763 0.0369 4.77 0.000
Siblings -0.2555 0.0598 -4.27 0.000
Father’s Edu Level 0.2484 0.0465 5.34 0.000
Mother’s Edu Level 0.1151 0.0534 2.16 0.031
Income 0.8390 0.0776 10.80 0.000
Loc 2 -0.4531 0.1142 -3.97 0.000
Loc 3 -0.4625 0.1117 -4.14 0.000
Loc 4 -1.3555 0.2337 -5.80 0.000
Type 2 0.3163 0.2502 1.26 0.206
Type 3 -1.8400 0.1037 -17.73 0.000
Busan 0.1787 0.1652 1.08 0.279
Jeonbuk -0.5270 0.2383 -2.21 0.027
Reg. Seoul 09 0.6612 0.2010 3.29 0.001
Reg. Seoul 10 0.5423 0.2789 1.94 0.052
Reg. Busan 08 -0.8574 0.2261 -3.79 0.000
Reg. Busan 09 -0.4573 0.2753 -1.66 0.097
Reg. Busan 10 -1.2735 0.4375 -2.91 0.004
Reg. Jeonbuk 10 -0.0643 0.6087 -0.11 0.916
dum. 2008 -1.9567 0.0752 -26.00 0.000
dum. 2009 -2.4709 0.1002 -24.66 0.000
dum. 2010 -2.7959 0.1450 -19.28 0.000
Constant -2.3018 0.4584 -5.02 0.000
sigma u 1.2160 0.0456 26.63 0.000
sigma e 1.8650 0.0319 58.29 0.000
Table 6: Panel Tobit Model Results
Note: As in Pooled OLS estimation, Busan and Jeonbuk dummies are in-
cluded in order to estimate the regulation effects of Busan, Jeonbuk, and
Seoul region (Seoul dummy is Loc 1 dummy, but it is omitted in the estima-
tion due to multicollinearity problem with Loc 2, Loc 3, and Loc 4). Each






z P>| z | [95% CI]
Gen 2* 0.1436 0.0574 2.50 0.012 0.0311 0.2562
Grade 0.1347 0.0282 4.77 0.000 0.0794 0.1900
Siblings -0.1952 0.0457 -4.27 0.000 -0.2849 -0.1056
Father’s Edu 0.1898 0.3556 5.34 0.000 0.1201 0.2595
Mother’s Edu 0.0880 0.0408 2.16 0.031 0.0080 0.1680
Income 0.6412 0.0593 10.81 0.000 0.5249 0.7275
Loc 2* -0.3438 0.0860 -4.00 0.000 -0.5125 -0.1751
Loc 3* -0.3487 0.0831 -4.20 0.000 -0.5116 -0.1858
Loc 4* -0.9037 0.1310 -6.89 0.000 -1.1606 -0.6468
Type 2* 0.2481 0.2012 1.23 0.217 -0.1462 0.6425
Type 3* -1.2452 0.0601 -20.70 0.000 -1.3632 -1.1273
Busan* 0.1382 0.1293 1.07 0.285 -0.1152 0.3918
Jeonbuk* -0.3838 0.1645 -2.33 0.020 -0.7062 -0.0613
Reg. Seoul 09* 0.5315 0.1688 3.15 0.002 0.2005 0.8625
Reg. Seoul 10* 0.4329 0.2315 1.87 0.061 -0.0207 0.8867
Reg. Busan 08* -0.6043 0.1449 -4.17 0.000 -0.8884 -0.3202
Reg. Busan 09* -0.3351 0.1926 -1.74 0.082 -0.7127 0.0424
Reg. Busan 10* -0.8504 0.2462 -3.45 0.001 -1.3331 -0.3677
Reg. Jeonbuk 10* -0.0488 0.4598 -0.11 0.915 -0.9501 0.8523
dum. 2008* -1.3798 0.0477 -28.89 0.000 -1.4734 -1.2862
dum. 2009 * -1.5918 0.0513 -30.99 0.000 -1.6925 -1.4911
dum. 2010* -1.6177 0.0559 -28.90 0.000 -1.7274 -1.5080
Table 7: Marginal Effects from Panel Tobit Estimation
Note: Marginal effects are calculated in order to estimate the actual effec-
tiveness of regulations after panel tobit estimation. With variables marked
with star (*), dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1.
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DGP Value of c
α-level (N=100) α-level (N=1000)
0.01 0.05 0.10 0.01 0.05 0.10
Case 1
2.0 0.009 0.045 0.092 0.015 0.050 0.079
2.5 0.007 0.046 0.106 0.015 0.044 0.096
3.0 0.003 0.043 0.099 0.017 0.070 0.121
Case 2
2.0 0.006 0.038 0.094 0.006 0.023 0.094
2.5 0.018 0.057 0.112 0.006 0.034 0.068
3.0 0.006 0.047 0.084 0.018 0.050 0.095
Case 3
2.0 0.012 0.029 0.078 0.015 0.068 0.111
2.5 0.005 0.032 0.075 0.008 0.050 0.119
3.0 0.008 0.041 0.079 0.007 0.037 0.091
Case 4
2.0 0.922 0.994 0.999 1.000 1.000 1.000
2.5 0.915 0.978 0.992 1.000 1.000 1.000
3.0 0.916 0.991 0.999 1.000 1.000 1.000
Table 8: Results from Monte Carlo Simulations
Note: The table presents rejection probabilities under the null hypothesis.
The Monte Carlo Experiments are done for 1000 times. The weight function
used in this experiment is w(x) = 1. Critical values are computed after
bootstrapping 500 times. α level is the significance level and the value of c
determines the size of a contact set.
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Case Sample Mean Std. Dev. Median
Pooled
No Reg. 4669 30.0791 34.8433 22
Reg. 344 31.5698 36.3207 30
Seoul
No Reg. 344 31.5698 36.3207 30
Reg. 96 36.6771 43.0516 30
Busan
No Reg. 238 34.0630 32.8359 25
Reg. 126 12.0714 19.7732 0
Jeonbuk
No Reg. 34 8.8235 16.4325 0
Reg. 20 8.3500 16.8500 0
Table 9: Descriptive Statistics of Each Comparing Group
Note: Pooled case is combined regulated group and unregulated group. In
Seoul’s case, regulated group is from 2010 and unregulated group is from
2008. Likewise, Busan’s regulated group is in 2009 while its unregulated
group is from 2007. Lastly, Jeonbuk’s comparing years are 2009 and 2010.
Case Sample Mean Std. Dev. Median
Pooled
No Reg. 4669 -0.0061 1.4923 0.2358
Reg. 670 0.0140 1.6488 -0.1782
Seoul
No Reg. 764 -0.0129 1.4555 0.3473
Reg. 276 0.0000 1.7293 0.5946
Busan
No Reg. 238 0.0035 1.2795 0.3169
Reg. 374 0.0000 1.5361 -0.4842
Jeonbuk
No Reg. 141 -0.0093 1.3445 -0.2193
Reg. 20 0.0000 1.4638 -0.6133
Table 10: Descriptive Statistics of Residuals
Note: Likewise, each comparing group is identical to that of Table 10. Resid-
uals are obtained from conducting Pooled OLS estimation. Except Pooled
case (Case 1), Pooled OLS is conducted without location dummies (Loc 2,
Loc 3, Loc 4, Busan, and Jeonbuk) and regulation dummies (Since I divide
the residuals depending on the existence of regulation).
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Case
No Control Residual Dominance
c WF 1 WF 2 c WF 1 WF 2
Pooled
3.0 0.640 0.990 0.5 0.304 0.000
3.5 0.642 0.994 0.7 0.308 0.002
4.0 0.656 0.990 1.0 0.310 0.006
Seoul
2.0 0.500 0.116 0.3 0.256 0.000
2.5 0.492 0.114 0.5 0.380 0.002
3.0 0.476 0.090 0.7 0.400 0.016
Busan
3.0 0.700 0.972 0.5 0.052 0.000
3.5 0.726 0.980 0.7 0.052 0.000
4.0 0.694 0.972 1.0 0.068 0.000
Jeonbuk
0.01 0.000 0.258 0.1 0.198 0.056
0.02 0.000 0.296 0.3 0.308 0.296
0.05 0.000 0.450 0.5 0.322 0.308
Table 11: First-Order Stochastic Dominance (Test 1)
Note: This table shows p-values from the results of first-order stochastic
dominance test under H0 : F0 5 F1 for all x, with no control and residuals
respectively. The tests are conducted with different values of c and weight
functions. WF1 refers to w(x) = 1 {x ≤ µ}, and WF 2 refers to w(x) = 1.
The value of c determines the size of a contact set (cN = cN
−1log(log(N))).
The number of bootstrap is 500.
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Case
No Control Residual Dominance
c WF 1 WF 2 c WF 1 WF 2
Pooled
3.0 0.000 0.000 0.5 0.000 0.000
3.5 0.000 0.000 0.7 0.000 0.002
4.0 0.000 0.000 1.0 0.000 0.008
Seoul
2.0 0.216 0.636 0.3 0.002 0.000
2.5 0.234 0.622 0.5 0.004 0.004
3.0 0.208 0.592 0.7 0.022 0.016
Busan
3.0 0.000 0.000 0.5 0.000 0.000
3.5 0.000 0.000 0.7 0.000 0.000
4.0 0.000 0.000 1.0 0.000 0.000
Jeonbuk
0.01 0.000 0.254 0.1 0.078 0.020
0.02 0.000 0.328 0.3 0.176 0.226
0.05 0.000 0.458 0.5 0.166 0.260
Table 12: First-Order Stochastic Dominance (Test 2)
Note: Different from Table 12 (Test 1), this table shows p-values from the
results of first-order stochastic dominance test under H0 : F0 = F1 for all x,
with no control and residuals respectively. The tests are conducted with
different values of c and weight functions. WF1 refers to w(x) = 1 {x ≤ µ},
and WF 2 refers to w(x) = 1. The value of c determines the size of a contact
set (cN = cN
−1log(log(N))). The number of bootstrap is 500.
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Case
No Control Residual Dominance
c WF 1 WF 2 c WF 1 WF 2
Pooled
40 0.520 0.196 0.5 0.254 0.450
45 0.584 0.254 0.7 0.262 0.430
50 0.548 0.654 1.0 0.268 0.438
Seoul
8.0 0.490 0.084 0.5 0.432 0.524
9.0 0.522 0.104 0.7 0.434 0.542
10.0 0.526 0.106 1.0 0.442 0.550
Busan
30 0.540 0.220 0.5 0.026 0.342
35 0.566 0.236 0.7 0.072 0.374
40 0.570 0.248 1.0 0.084 0.414
Jeonbuk
1.0 0.000 0.574 0.1 0.000 0.438
2.0 0.000 0.602 0.3 0.174 0.476
5.0 0.000 0.618 0.5 0.196 0.478
Table 13: Second-Order Stochastic Dominance (Test 1)
Note: This table shows p-values from the results of second-order stochastic
dominance test under H0 : D0 5 D1 for all x, with no control and residuals
respectively. D0 =
∫ x
−∞ F0dx and D1 =
∫ x
−∞ F1dx The number of bootstrap
is 500. WF1 refers to w(x) = 1 {x ≤ µ}, and WF 2 refers to w(x) = 1. The




No Control Residual Dominance
c WF 1 WF 2 c WF 1 WF 2
Pooled
40 0.000 0.000 0.5 0.000 0.192
45 0.000 0.000 0.7 0.004 0.184
50 0.000 0.000 1.0 0.006 0.154
Seoul
8.0 0.190 0.562 0.5 0.000 0.198
9.0 0.212 0.518 0.7 0.000 0.208
10.0 0.208 0.588 1.0 0.002 0.200
Busan
30 0.000 0.000 0.5 0.044 0.116
35 0.000 0.000 0.7 0.114 0.112
40 0.000 0.000 1.0 0.120 0.120
Jeonbuk
1.0 0.000 0.480 0.1 0.334 0.418
2.0 0.000 0.510 0.3 0.690 0.464
5.0 0.000 0.484 0.5 0.668 0.470
Table 14: Second-Order Stochastic Dominance (Test 2)
Note: In Test 2 of second-order stochastic dominance, the null hypothesis is
different from Test 1 of Table 14. This table shows p-values from the results of
second-order stochastic dominance test under H0 : D0 = D1 for all x, with
no control and residuals respectively. D0 =
∫ x
−∞ F0dx and D1 =
∫ x
−∞ F1dx
The number of bootstrap is 500. WF1 refers to w(x) = 1 {x ≤ µ}, and WF







w(x) = 1{x ≤ µ} w(x) = 1
c1 c2 Test 1 Test 2 Test 1 Test 2
Busan
0.1 0.1 0.830 0.000 0.652 0.000
0.2 0.2 0.834 0.000 0.774 0.000
0.5 0.5 0.842 0.000 0.892 0.000
Seoul
0.05 0.10 0.242 0.240 0.032 0.052
0.07 0.12 0.258 0.290 0.054 0.038
0.10 0.15 0.290 0.398 0.062 0.042
Table 15: Joint Hypothesis: First-Order Stochastic Dominance with No Con-
trol
Note: This table shows p-values after conducting FOSD test with residuals.
In case of Busan when w(x) = 1 {x ≤ µ}, I integrated over large X instead





w(x) = 1{x ≤ µ} w(x) = 1
c1 c2 Test 1 Test 2 Test 1 Test 2
Busan
0.5 0.5 0.924 0.000 0.984 0.000
0.7 0.7 0.940 0.000 0.992 0.000
1.0 1.0 0.950 0.000 0.996 0.002
Seoul
0.01 0.10 0.682 0.006 0.806 0.154
0.02 0.12 0.702 0.096 0.822 0.150
0.05 0.15 0.796 0.174 0.846 0.274
Table 16: Joint Hypothesis: First-Order Stochastic Dominance with Residuals
Note: This table shows p-values after conducting FOSD test with residuals.
The number of bootstrap is 500.
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Appendix B: Figures
Figure 1: Kernel Density of Private Education Expenditure
Note: This figure shows yearly distribution of private education expenditure.
Since 2008, possibly due to the impact of economic recession triggered by
subprime mortgage crisis of the United States, overall private education ex-
penditures significantly reduced compared to 2007.
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(a) Pooled CDFs (b) CDFs of Seoul
(c) CDFs of Busan (d) CDFs of Jeonbuk
Figure 2: Empirical CDFs of Private Education Expenditure
Note: The figures above are empirical CDF of each case. Seoul implemented
the regulation in 2009 while Busan did in 2008 and Jeonbuk did in 2010.
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(a) Pooled Case (b) Seoul
(c) Busan (d) Jeonbuk
Figure 3: Difference in CDFs
Note: The figures above are difference in CDFs with respect to private edu-
cation expenditure. As quickly imagined from the empirical CDFs, the dif-
ference is calculated by F0 − F1 ( CDF with no regulation - CDF with reg-
ulation). Seoul region shows a single crossing in CDF, which shows wide
variation. Also, in Jeonbuk region, as multiple crossings in CDF occur, it re-
flects wider variation in difference of CDFs. The difference of CDFs in other
cases is shown all under zero.
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(a) Pooled Case (b) Seoul
(c) Busan (d) Jeonbuk
Figure 4: CDFs of Residuals from Pooled OLS Estimation
Note: Each figure shows CDF of residuals from Pooled OLS estimation. This
is for testing first-order stochastic dominance. In pooled case, comparing
groups are whether there is regulation or not. Comparing years of Seoul
region is 2008 (before regulation) and 2010 (after regulation), and Busan’s
comparing years are 2007 (before regulation) and 2009 (after regulation). In
case of Jeonbuk, 2009 and 2010 are comparing years of regulation.
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(a) Pooled (b) Seoul
(c) Busan (d) Jeonbuk
Figure 5: Second-Order Distributions with No Control
Note: Each figure shows second-order distribution with no control. In pooled
case, comparing groups are whether there is regulation or not. Comparing
years of Seoul region is 2008 (before regulation) and 2010 (after regulation),
and Busan’s comparing years are 2007 (before regulation) and 2009 (after
regulation). In case of Jeonbuk, 2009 and 2010 are comparing years of regu-
lation.
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(a) Pooled (b) Seoul
(c) Busan (d) Jeonbuk
Figure 6: Second-Order Distributions of Residuals
Note: Each figure shows second-order distribution of residuals from Pooled
OLS estimation. In pooled case, comparing groups are whether there is reg-
ulation or not. Comparing years of Seoul region is 2008 (before regulation)
and 2010 (after regulation), and Busan’s comparing years are 2007 (before
regulation) and 2009 (after regulation). In case of Jeonbuk, 2009 and 2010
are comparing years of regulation.
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(a) Seoul 1 (b) Seoul 2
(c) Busan 1 (d) Busan 2
Figure 7: Joint Hypothesis with No Control
Note: Stochastic dominance test with no control in Seoul and Busan re-
gions respectively. In Seoul, the base year of joint test is 2008. Thus, Seoul
1 presents CDF with no control in 2008 and 2009 while Seoul 2 is that of
2008 and 2010. On the other hand, the base year of Busan is 2007. Busan 1
represents CDF with no control in 2008 and 2009, and Busan 2 is CDF of
residuals from 2009 and 2010.
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(a) Seoul 1 (b) Seoul 2
(c) Busan 1 (d) Busan 2
Figure 8: Joint Hypothesis: Residual Dominance
Note: Each figure shows CDFs of residuals from Pooled OLS estimation.
In Seoul, the base year of joint test is 2008. Thus, Seoul 1 presents CDF
of residuals in 2008 and 2009 while Seoul 2 is that of 2008 and 2010. On
the other hand, the base year of Busan is 2007. Busan 1 represents CDF of




한국의 치열한 대입 경쟁으로 인해 유발된 사교육에 대한 막대한
지출로 인해, 정부는 학원 교습시간에 대한 규제와 더불어 여러 사교육 규
제 수단을 마련하는 데 노력을 기울여왔다. 본 논문은 한국고용정보원의
청년 패널 데이터(2007년-2010년)를 기반으로, 고등학생들에 대한 학원 교
습시간규제에관한효과를분석하였다.사교육비패턴은성별,가구소득,
부모의 학력, 학교 유형, 그리고 지역에 따라 다르게 나타난다. 이러한 사
교육비 패턴 하에, 규제 효과는 각 지역에 따라 상이한 것으로 나타났다.
먼저,패널토빗모형추정을하였을때,부산지역은학원교습시간규제가
사교육비 지출 감소에 유의미향 영향을 끼치는 것으로 나타난 반면, 서울
지역은 학원 교습시간 규제가 사교육비 지출 감소에 효과적이지 않은 것
으로 나타났다. 또한, 본 논문에서는 규제 효과에 관해 지역별로 1차 및 2
차 확률적 지배 검정(Stochastic Dominance Test)을 하였다. 확률적 지배
검정을 한 결과, 토빗 모형을 추정했을 때와 유사한 결과가 도출되었다.
주요어: 사교육비, 규제 효과, 토빗 모형, 확률적 지배, 부트스트랩
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